Access to justice denied: The betrayal of victims with disabilities by courts and prosecutors in Romania

Another scandal has recently broken out in Romania around accusations that Clara, a sweet 9-year-old girl with Down syndrome, was beaten up at the special school in Bucharest she was attending. Allegations of abuse against people with disabilities occur regularly to an increasingly indifferent reception from the general public and the authorities. Before Clara, we received news about children tied to beds in a hospital in Bacau. Before that, there was the scandal about a social care home in Oradea where physical and sexual abuse of young residents was rife. Before that, there were the sad on-going reports of young severely disabled youth in a social care home in Bucharest permanently tied to their beds and starved, outsiders’ access to the institution denied. Serial allegations of abuse against children and adults with disabilities institutionalised in separate schools, separate institutions and separate hospitals, stretch back as far as I can remember, certainly since the fall of communism in 1989. There is one common thread connecting all these incidents, aside from public indifference. Nothing ever happens – nobody loses their job or goes to prison, no institution closes down and nobody ever leaves the institution. This brings me to the topic of this post (the first in a series hopefully) - the complete absence of remedies in Romania for rights violations against persons with disabilities.

Romania stands out among European countries in terms of the number and range of disability cases that reached the European Court of Human Rights, a relatively recent phenomenon. We got cases on involuntary detention, on rape, on legal capacity, on ill treatment by the police, on conditions in institutions, on accessibility, on education, on people who died in institutions because of cold and hunger and lack of medical treatment. Currently, Romania has the only two disability cases pending before the Grand Chamber: Gherghina and Campeanu. The absence of remedies is a common feature in almost all these cases, apparent at different levels of inquiry: exhaustion of domestic remedies, procedural obligations under article 5, the right to an effective remedy, procedural obligations to investigate abuse, or the right to a fair trial. One of the requests that the State received from the European Court in Campeanu was to provide examples of successful prosecutions of abuse in institutions. Notwithstanding the notorious fact that abuse is rife in Romanian institutions, the State was not able to provide one example. On the other hand, we could show that no prosecutions resulted in relation to the hundreds of people who died at the Poiana Mare Hospital during consecutive winters at the beginning of the 2000s.

The European Court recognised the crisis of the court system in Romania, making some remarkably sweeping statements on the issue of domestic remedies. There is no remedy in Romania to challenge the necessity of compulsory psychiatric examination taken under Article 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court said (C.B. v Romania). In Cristian Teodorescu v Romania and B. v Romania (No.2), the Court identified gaps in the Romanian mental health law, which restricted the access to justice of persons seeking to complain against their involuntary commitment in psychiatric hospital. It was not surprising, the Court concluded, that no complaints based on this law had been introduced over a period of ten years since it has come into force on 8 August 2002. In Parascineti, the Court noted that the Government was not able to demonstrate that any complaints had been filed before domestic courts regarding living conditions in a psychiatric hospital for the period 2002 to 2010. In Stelian Tanase, the Court determined that a national court’s contempt towards a person with disabilities may render a remedy that is effective in principle, such as a torts action on the basis of Arts. 998 and 999 of the Civil Code, ineffective.

Elsewhere, in Filip v Romania, the Court found a procedural breach of Article 3 on account of the “passivity” of authorities in dealing with the applicant’s complaints related to the living conditions during his commitment in a psychiatric hospital, as well as to the alleged ill-treatment suffered during that time. An additional violation of Article 5§4 was based on the prosecutors’ refusal to decide on the merits of the complaint regarding the lawfulness of the commitment, as well as the length of the procedures in the same case. In B v Romania, Archip v Romania and M.B. v Romania, the Court found violations of the procedural arm of Article 3, on account of the authorities’ failures to conduct an effective investigation into allegations of ill-treatment against persons with mental health problems, including rape.

On more benign, but no less important rights such as social support, accessibility and education, the situation is equally problematic. One of our main claims in Gherghina, currently pending before the Grand Chamber, is that legislation on accessibility duties is so vague as to render any remedies at the national level illusory and ineffective. I am currently looking at the remedies that a child with disabilities may use to complain in relation to a breach of their right to quality inclusive education, in relation to another case pending before the Court, Stoian. Considering the sheer complexity of an ever shifting legislation, the vague and non-committal wording of these provisions, the presence of a multiplicity of state agencies with overlapping and conflicting duties, I strongly doubt victims of discrimination have any remedies to exhaust in Romania before going to Strasbourg, similarly to the cases on segregation of Roma in education against Greece.

These cases reveal a systemic problem in Romania whereby courts, prosecutors and other agencies systematically defer to doctors, educators and other “professionals” to take life and death decisions on behalf of persons with disabilities. In doing so, they share the outlook of Romanian society more broadly, that would rather look away when a person with disabilities is abused. However, in doing so, judges and prosecutors swim against the tide. Sooner or later, something must change. Romania is firmly under international spotlight this year for its treatment of persons with disabilities, and for a good reason. As mentioned above, two leading disability cases against Romania are pending before the Grand Chamber of the European Court. Disability is one of the issues on the agenda for the Romania country visit of the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner at the end of March. The Committee for the Prevention of Torture will also visit Romania this year, and is likely to include psychiatric institutions and/or social care homes on its agenda. Al Jazeera has been filming a documentary slamming Romania’s failure to reform its institutions, which will probably also air in March. Finally, the European Commission is putting increased pressure on Romania to adopt its disability strategy, in order to better spend EU funds in this area. Who knows, maybe Clara’s case is the marker for a new beginning after all.   

The next article in the series on remedy will look at whether the European Court of Human Rights is a viable remedy for applicants with disabilities.

PS: All judgments mentioned in this article are available on HUDOC, the European Court's database.

Inca o sansa pierduta - raportul CNCD/IPP pe accesibilitate

A trecut mai bine de o satapmana de la lansarea raportului realizat de CNCD si IPP privind “accesibilizarea spatiului public pentru persoanele cu dizabilitati”. Raportul e parte a unei campanii prefatate de un videoclip despre care am mai scris AICI.

Una din problemele mari cu care m-am confruntat pledand in fata CEDO in cazuri pe accesibilitate a fost tocmai lipsa surselor credibile care sa demonstreze ceea ce stim cu totii – ca mediul fizic la noi in tara nu prea e accesibil. Pe cat sunt de importante analizele independente (vorba vine) pentru a acoperi aceasta lacuna, pe atat sunt de rare. Eu cunosc o singura astfel de cercetare datand din 2006. Prin urmare cred ca e oportun sa fac niste comentarii pe marginea acestui raport, pana cand nu dispare cu totul din atentia publica. Mai vreau sa stabilesc ca sunt o persoana avizata, cu precizarea ca perspectiva mea este cea unui avocat. Lucrez de ani intregi in domeniul dizabilitatii, iar pe accesibilitate in mod special am lucrat in mai multe cazuri importante la CEDO: Farcas v Romania (sedinta publica, decizie 14 septembrie 2010), Gherghina v Romania (trimis la Marea Camera, sedinta publica 12 noiembrie 2014), Elvira Popa v Romania (pe rol), Stoian v Romania (pe rol).

Metodologia raportului, constand in principal in formularea unor cereri sub Legea informatiilor de interes public, nu este de natura a oferi o imagine corecta cu privire gradul real de accesibilizare a institutiilor cu pricina. In primul rand multe institutii vor minti – o fac in mod current, si bunaoara nimic nu le-a impiedicat sa o faca in corespondenta cu CEDO. In al doilea rand este binecunoscut faptul ca institutiile nu cunosc parametrii obligatiilor care le revin prin lege. Problema rampelor construite in bataie de joc e notorie, ele sunt vizibile la tot pasul. Ei bine, cel mai probabil institutiile au raportat aceste rampe ca fiind conforme. In sfarsit, chestionarele folosite sunt simpliste – evaluand de exemplu accesibilitatea mediului fizic doar prin raportare la existenta rampelor. O metodologie mai potrivita a fost folosita in raportul FSD 2006, care a elaborat chestionare incluzand indicatori multipli de accesibilitate, care mai apoi au fost completate la fata locului de echipe de monitori. Sau metodologia raportului recent publicat in Moldova, unde au fost efectuate masuratori complexe la fata locului privind gradul de accesibilizare a unui esantion de cladiri publice. Sunt convins ca aceste monitorizari nu se pot face stand la birou, ci este indispensabil mersul la fata locului, preferabil insotit de o persoana cu dizabilitati,

Autorii raportului nu prea tin seama de natura servicului oferit in cladirea cu pricina. Una e administratia financiara unde intri si stai cinci minute, si alta e ditamai universitatea unde stai patru ani, cu o infrastructura mult mai complexa. Pe de alta parte, concentrarea pe obiective publice izolate e neproductiva, ce conteaza e un lant neintrerupt de servicii accesibilizate, cu alte cuvinte trebuie sa fii in stare sa pleci de acasa, sa urci in metrou, sa traversezi strada, si sa ajungi la universitate unde sa fii in stare sa studiezi cot la cot cu ceilalti studenti. Nu prea ma ajuta in nici un fel faptul ca intersectia x este accesibilizata daca transportul public nu e, si bordurile din zona sunt prea ridicate.

Principala cheie pentru rezolvarea problemei accesibilitatii in opinia mea (sau cel putin una dintre ele), este construirea unui sistem de remedii functional, care sa permita titularilor dreptului sa solicite executarea sa in instanta. Raportul din Moldova mai sus-amintit contine o analiza a sistemului de remedii de acolo, punand punctul pe I:

“nerespectarea normativelor în construcții privind accesibilitatea persoanelor cu dizabilități la infrastructură, chiar dacă prevede răspundere administrativă care se sancționeazăcu amendă, nu este suficientă, deoarece nu împiedică nerespectarea sistematicăa acestor normative, și nici nu obligă la compensarea costurilor legate de înlăturarea deficiențelor în aplicarea normativelor respective în documentația de proiect sau în proiectele de execuție.

Din pacate, raportul CNCD/IPP nu contine o astfel de analiza. In loc suntem serviti cu o enumerare anodina si fara sens a realizarilor CNCD in materie, egale fix cu zero. Interventia CNCD este structurata in doua parti. Prima parte include eternele tabele si scheme detaliind numarul petitiilor primite in functie de criteriul incident si deznodamantul lor. Nu este clar ce semnifica aceste tabele, care sunt copiate mecanic de la un an la altul in in rapoartele CNCD. Sugestia e ca ele ar constitui un indicator al fenomenului discriminarii in Romania. Raportat la numarul total al persoanelor cu dizabilitati din Romania, faptul ca CNCD primeste annual 20-30-40 plangeri (cu obiect neidentificat pentru ca ele nu sunt publicate), inseamna cel mult o incercare de manipulare a realitatii sau de autolegitimare frauduloasa in fata criticilor. A doua parte a analizei, traditionala si ea, este o insiruire fara cap si coada a cazurilor CNCD-ului in care este incident criteriul dizabilitatii. Doar un singur caz din cele unsprezece raportate – cel privind strada nebetonata din Busteni, si ala foarte suspect in lipsa deciziei in sine –priveste tema centrala a raportului – accesibilizarea mediului construit de catre autoritatile publice. Dupa cum am explicat pe scurt aici, CNCD-ul nu considera lipsa accesibilitatii ca fiind o forma de discriminare sanctionabila sub OG 137, din motive de competenta materiala, sau de fond. Mai mult decat atat, ce nu raporteaza CNCD-ul e mult mai interesant decat ce alege sa puna in vitrina, in conditiile in care institutia e complet netransparenta, iar jurisprudenta e haotica: un fel de in fata-i vopsit gardul si in spate leopardul. Pe langa faptul ca prestatia CNCD-ului nu este examinata critic si obiectiv, lipseste cu totul o analiza a eficientei (sau nu) a altor potentiale remedii. Slava domnului, gratie unui grup de persone cu dizabilitati si avocati hotarati, exista acum o jurispudenta relativ usor accesibila si direct relevanta (macar ca e negativa, dar cu invatamintele ei) pentru tematica raportului, atat in instantele interne, inclusiv la cel mai inalt nivel, ICCJ, cat si, iata, la CEDO. Aceasta este inca o lacuna de neinteles a raportului.

Raportul concluzioneaza totusi ca “in Romania mediul public nu este inca accesibil persoanelor cu dizabilitati in cea mai mare parte”.Avand in vedere ca premisele sale metodologice sunt suspecte, dupa cum am aratat mai sus, ma tem ca aceasta concluzie este prea optimista, si nici nu incepe macar sa surprinda dezastrul din Romania si drama personala a zecilor de mii de persone cu dizabilitati care isi rateaza viata din cauza lipsei accesibilitatii. In mod constant, raportul contine afirmatii de tipul “Universitatea din Pitesti asigura maini curente în cladirile sale, precum si un interpret”. Este insa sau nu accesibila universitatea in intregul ei? Eu stiu ca in ansamblul ei nu este, si ma judec pe chestia asta la Marea Camera a CEDO, in cazul Gherghina, si daca nu e, ce rost are sa spui numai ca are maini curente? In ipoteza in care raportul sugereaza ca CNCD-ul este un remediu eficient pentru plangerile pe discriminare, el denatureaza inca o data realitatea. Cam despre asta e vorba in acest raport. Raportul asta nu merge la ONU, dar caciula singuri, sigur ne-am furat-o. Consemnez din pacate (inca) o ocazie ratata.

As avea si alte observatii, dar ma opresc deocamdata aici.

CNCD-ul nu este solutia, ci parte din problema pe care incercam sa o combatem

Zilele acestea un fimulet cu fetele triste si muzica lacrimogena de rigoare cand vine vorba de dizabilitati anunta o noua campanie a CNCD (si a IPP) pe tema accesibilitatii. Mesajul fimuletului: “Accesibilitatea este un drept, nu este un beneficiu”. 

Pe cat de adevarata e aceasta propozitie, pe atat de goala de continut. Accesibilitatea este deja, pe undeva, un drept, nu asta e neaparat problema. Legislatia romaneasca consacra un sistem de obligatii de asigurare a accesibilizarii inca din 1999, prin OG 102, si poate de si mai inainte. In timp ce proclama grandios ca “accesibilitatea este … un factor esential de exercitare a drepturilor … persoanelor cu handicap in societate”, legea actuala (448/2006) a diluat in acelasi timp in mod decisiv termenii OG 102, lasand obligatia de accesibilizare la cheremul constructorilor si altor furnizori de servicii. In fine, legea mai treaca mearga. Cumva contra intuitiv, problemele reale nici macar nu tin neaparat de bani, ci rezida, intre altele, in:

•        -  lipsa unui mecanism coerent si eficient de monitorizare si implementare a obligatiilor de lege;
•           lipsa implicarii sistematice a persoanelor cu dizabilitati in executarea acestor obligatii;
•     lipsa coordonarii intre furnizorii de servicii publice pentru a realiza un lant neintrerupt de facilitati accesibile;
•        lipsa unui sistem functional de remedii la dispozitia victimelor pentru a solicita implementarea legii, inclusiv o legislatie anti-discriminare ineficienta si un organism de implementare ipocrit si incompetent (vezi demonstratia mai jos)…si altele

Ori acest spot pastreaza lucrurile in zona convenabila a principiilor lipsite de substanta si de angajament.

Pe de alta parte, tin sa subliniez dublul standard promovat de cncd atunci cand se raporteaza la obligatia in cauza. Cui declara ritos cncd-ul ca accesibilitatea este un drept? Structurilor statului, normal, principalul debitor al obligatiei. Stati putin, dar cncd-ul nu e structura a statului? Si a propos, cncd-ul nu are nici un rol in a monitoriza implementarea legii 448 zisa a drepturilor persoanelor cu handicap? Bat saua sa priceapa calul, si revin la enuntul din lege: “accesibilitate este … un factor esential de exercitare a drepturilor … persoanelor cu handicap in societate”. Nu un factor intre alti factori, ci unul esential. Per a contrario, fara accesibilitate nu ai acces la drepturi. Un exemplu mai clar de discriminare nici nu exista, o spune legea explicit. Nu e nici o filosofie, buna credinta si minte-n cap sa existe.

Si CNCD-ul ce spune? Pai conform asteptarilor, pusi in fata unor victime in carne si oase, care recurg la ei in disperare de cauza si in ultima instanta, CNCD-ul o da cotita. Decizia 260/2011 este un exemplu de interpretare stramba si contradictorie a legii. Intre alte capete de cerere, petentul, un copil in scaun rulant, s-a plans de lipsa de accesibilitate a infrastructurii stradale. CNCD-ul s-a declarat necompetent: pentru ca “nu este o problema de acces la servicii ci de un drept incalcat prevazut de Legea 448, sanctionarea caruia intra in cometenta DGPPH”. Pe de alta parte, un alt capat de plangere, in acelasi caz, priveste lipsa de accesibilitate a unei institutii publice care furnizeaza servicii educationale. CNCD-ul confirma lipsa accesibilitatii, dar o scalda – ar fi discriminare, dar e dintr-aia benigna, fara sanctiune. De ce? pentru ca nu e “refuz efectiv” in sensul Art 11 al OG 137, petentul fusese inscris la cursuri, e nesansa lui ca nu poate intra in cladire. Fara sanctiune administrativa, parata e doar urecheata parinteste cu o recomandare. (In paranteza fie spus, cu acest caz si altele ne vedem la CEDO, inclusiv pe accesibilitate, si inclusiv din alea vazute de cncd - si sa vezi acolo distractie.)

Clipul asta ilustreaza de minune ambiguitatea cultivata si asumata de CNCD. Pe de o parte face propaganda in sprijinul victimelor, fluturand stindardul minoritarilor la televizor si in ziare, pe de alta parte cand ii parvin cazuri concrete de discriminare le respinge fara menajamente, recurgand la trucuri jenante. La pride parade reprezenantii CNCD sunt in primul rand, la serviciu ii tin in brate pe homofobi ca Puiu Hasotti si altii ca el. Cu o mana ii sanctioneaza pe discriminatori, cu alta ii apara la instanta si la cedo, blamand vicitmele. Cum nu s-a schimbat nimic in cinspe ani, puteti fi siguri ca nu se va schimba nimic nici peste zece, doua zeci sau o suta de ani cu gasca actuala de la CNCD. CNCD-ul a fost asimilat de stat in intregime, transformandu-se din tratament impotriva discriminarii in simptom al bolii insisi. Este un cal troian instrumentat pentru a atrage si neutraliza orice contestatie la adresa status-quo-ului. Fiind insasi radacina raului cu care ne luptam, CNCD-ul trebuie contestat cu putere, reformat radical, sau in ultima instanta, desfiintat pentru a reincepe de la zero.

In fine, revenind la clipul buclucas – e parte a unei campanii de “constientizare”, anuntata cu surle si trambite pe pagina web a CNCD, care marseaza triumfator pe noua limba de lemn a luptei antidiscriminare:

“Constituindu-se intr-unul dintre cele mai numeroase grupuri din categoria persoanelor cu dizabilitati din Romania, persoanele cu dizabilitati locomotorii se confrunta cu situatii frecvente de discriminare sau excludere, avand în vedere lipsa mijloacelor și amenajarilor corespunzatoare pentru accesul in cladiri, la facilitati si servicii publice precum institutii, spitale, transport in comun, taximetre etc.” (sublinierea mea).

Aceste situatii sunt atat de frecvente incat in cinspe ani de existenta CNCD-ului a sanctionat o singura data o autoritate publica in contextul lipsei de accesibilitate a infrastructurii fizice. Si in legatura cu decizia aia singura am rezerve – am aflat de ea din raportul abia lansat in cadrul campaniei mai sus-amintite, si astept sa imi parvina textul ei sa vad ce si cum. Acestea fiind spuse: voua, CNCD-ului, chiar nu va este rusine?

PS 1: A propos, poate cineva sa imi spuna daca sediul CNCD este accesibil cf. standardelor in vigoare?

PS 2: Tocmai am aflat ca sediul CNCD NU este accesibil persoanelor cu dizabilitati. 

Comentariu hotarare CEDO transgender H. v. Finlanda

Recent am publicat un comentariu asupra hotararii CEDO H. v. Finlanda, privind compatibilitatea legislatiei din acea tara care obliga persoanele trans care doresc sa-si schimbe documentele sa divorteze mai intai. Comentariul este publicat pe blogul Prof. Paul Johnson de la Universitatea York, Marea Britanie, ECHR Sexual Orientation Blog.

H. v Finland: transgender persons as collateral victims of prejudice against same-sex marriage

That the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in the case H. v. Finland delivered on 13 November 2012 passed almost unnoticed, is symptomatic of the fact that the widespread discrimination and human rights abuse that transgender persons suffer from remain largely ignored or neglected. Uniquely, such abuse is institutionalised in the form of legislation on the legal recognition of gender identity that includes harsh and extraordinary requirements such as compulsory divorce (as exemplified by this case), forced genital surgery and other medical treatment, and sterilisation. Although the Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom judgment represented a breakthrough for transgender rights in that it legitimised the act of crossing across the gender divide, it also stymied any further progress by explicitly allowing states discretion to regulate the process of legal gender recognition, including by imposing the requirements mentioned above. H. v. Finland is one of the Court’s first attempts at grappling with the issue of the compatibility of requirements attached to legal gender recognition with the European Convention on Human Rights. On this occasion, the Court committed some manifest errors, mainly as a consequence of misconstruing H. as a case about same-sex marriage. The Court almost completely ignored the applicant’s family rights claims although they qualify for heightened protection under the Convention. In addition, the Court offered a contradictory interpretation of Article 12 concerning the right to marry, which, it decided, applied and did not apply to the case at the same time. The Court would be well advised to accept the request pending before it that the case be referred to its Grand Chamber, before such an erroneous interpretation of the law becomes too entrenched.

The judgment 

The applicant is a transgender woman. She was assigned the male sex at birth, but in 2006 she was diagnosed with gender identity disorder. She underwent gender reassignment surgery and started living as a woman. The applicant has been happily married to her wife since 1996, with whom she had a child. Although the applicant was able to change her first name to a female name, her personal documents continue to identify her as male. The applicant filed a request to have this information changed in order to reflect her self-identified gender identity as a woman. Domestic courts in Finland rejected her request invoking legislation that made legal gender recognition of a married person contingent on them first obtaining a divorce. 

The applicant turned to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the compulsory divorce requirement in Finnish law was in breach of her rights under the Convention. On 13 November 2012 the Court declared the complaint admissible, but rejected it on the merits. In doing so, the Court relied heavily on its judgment in the same-sex marriage case Schalk and Kopf v. Austria. In that judgment, the Court rejected the applicants’ marriage claim on the basis that Article 12 defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and, in addition, allowed States discretion to regulate the issue. 

Under Article 8, the Court balanced the applicant’s right to legal gender recognition against the State’s interest to protect the traditional institution of marriage. In addition to relying on Article 12 as discussed above, the Court stated that it was essentially up to the applicant to make the choice between her marriage and legal gender recognition. In this context, the Court attached weight to the fact that the applicant had the possibility under Finnish law to turn his marriage ex lege into a same-sex registered partnership that offered similar benefits to marriage. The Court summarily rejected the applicants’ additional claims. In particular, the Court ruled that Article 12 was not applicable to the case since it only concerned the time when marriage was concluded, whereas nothing prevented the applicant from getting married in the first place. 

Comments 

As opposed to previous jurisprudence, on this occasion the Court did not fall back on the margin of appreciation doctrine, but instead engaged in a proportionality analysis on the substance of the case. Even so, in my opinion the Court made some manifest errors. Mainly, the Court construed H. v. Finland as a case concerning same-sex marriage, and consequently applied its precedent in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria to deny the applicant’s claims. However, H. v. Finland concerns primarily the applicant’s quest to live according to her self-identified gender identity, with same-sex marriage being an incidental and undesired outcome. By construing the case in this manner, the Court mistakenly relied on the broad consensus against same-sex marriage in Europe, as per the Schalk and Kopf ruling. Thus, the Court ignored the situation in many European countries which ban same-sex marriage, but which do not at the same time make legal gender recognition contingent on the divorce of the person concerned. Seen through this lens, the relevant consensus changes, to the extent that it actually favours the applicant – according to a 2012 ILGA Europe survey, 24 countries do not require married transgender persons to divorce upon obtaining legal gender recognition (including the six countries that allow same-sex marriage), as opposed to 22 countries that do, with the situation in one country being divided. Germany and Austria stand out among these countries as legal change there occurred as a result of authoritative apex court judgments (the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court respectively). The situation in these countries fundamentally undermines the Court’s assumption that compulsory divorce legislation is a proportionate means for securing the objective of protecting the traditional institution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman. 

The Court largely ignored the implications of compulsory divorce regulations in Finland for the applicant’s marriage and family life, which it did not include in the balancing exercise undertaken under Article 8 of the Convention. Admittedly, in Finland registered partnership is comparable to marriage in terms of the legal benefits offered. However, as the Court itself had emphasized on countless occasions when it was occupied to justify its special status, marriage has social and symbolic connotations that cannot easily be dismissed. This case reveals tensions in the Court’s jurisprudence more broadly, since on the one hand the Court emphasizes the importance of marriage justifying enhanced protection, and yet on the other it trivializes its significance in order to justify why some people (like the applicant) should be deprived of it. In addition, the Court has not considered in any detail the consequences of prolonged uncertainty and of the eventual dissolution of marriage on the applicant’s wife and minor daughter. What matters more though is that, as opposed to the applicants in Schalk and Kopf who demanded recognition of a presumptive right to get married, the applicant in this case benefited from an acquired right, which has to be protected in the interest of legal certainty, which the Court recognized elsewhere as a “an underlying value of the Convention” (Fabris v. France[GC], §66).

This case touches on another grey area in the Court’s case-law, namely that of the material scope of Article 12 and of its relationship with Article 8. As noted above, the Court held that Article 12 was not applicable to this case (§53), although adjudication under this heading could have been a viable alternative to Article 8 insofar as the applicant’s family rights claim was concerned. The Court’s approach is manifestly inconsistent, as it decided that Article 12 applied and did not apply to this case at the same time. On the one hand the Court relied on the strictures of Article 12 (marriage between man and woman, state discretion) to deny the applicant’s claims under Articles 8 and 12, on the other hand it declared Article 12 inapplicable, because it only concerned the foundational act of marriage and not married life as such. In my view, a consistent and logical interpretation of Article 12 left two possibilities to the Court. Either the Court could opt for a narrow interpretation of Article 12 as applying strictly to the foundational act of marriage. In this scenario Article 12 would not be an obstacle to recognising the continued validity of the applicant’s marriage subsequently to her legal gender recognition, as at the time when they got married the applicant and her spouse were a different sex couple. Or, the Court could interpret Article 12 more broadly to apply to married life in general and in particular to any interference resulting in the termination of marriage as exemplified by this case. In this scenario the Court would have to examine whether legislation compelling the applicant to divorce injures the “very substance of the right” to marry in line with its previous jurisprudence.

Campeanu v Romania la Marea Camera a CEDO: Introducere

De curand am primit vestea ca dosarul Centrul pentru Resurse Juridice in numele lui Valentin Campeanu v. Romania a fost trimis la Marea Camera a CEDO. Pe scurt, acest caz povesteste moartea lui Valentin Campeanu, un tanar institutionalizat, cu deficit de invatare, seropozitiv si abandonat de rude. Plangerea la Curte acopera ultimele luni din viata lui Campeanu, perioada in care a fost transferat intre diferite institutii de protectie sociala din Judetul Dolj care au refuzat sa-si asume responabilitatea ingrijirii sale, pentru ca in final a muri in conditii disperate la Spitalul Psihiatric Poiana Mare, de trista notorietate. 

Doar cauzele foarte importante ajung la Marea Camera: o Camera se desesizeaza in favoarea Marii Camere atunci cand cererea ridica "o problema grava pentru interpretarea Convenitiei sau a Protocoalelor sale" sau daca "solutionarea unei cauze poate conduce la o contradictie cu o hotarare pronuntata anterior de Curte".

Conform fisei de tara privind Romania realizata de CEDO, acesta este cea de-a cincea cauza impotriva Romaniei care ajunge la Marea Camera dupa Brumarescu (1999), Cumpana si Mazare (2004), Creanga (2012) si Sindicatul Pastorul cel Bun (pe rol), in aproape 20 de ani de cand s-a ratificat Conventia. Campeanu este una din putinele cauze privind drepturile persoanelor cu dizabilitati care ajunge la Marea Camera. Eu cel putin stiu doar de Stanev v Bulgaria, privind punerea sub interdictie si institutionalizarea unui barbat diagnosticat cu schizofrenie. 

Un alt indiciu privind importanta cauzei este oferit de numarul mare de intervenienti in procedura in fata Camerei. Mai ales il am in vedere pe Comisarul pentru Drepturile Omului al Consiliului Europei care si-a exercitat pentru prima si singura data pana acum dreptul de a interveni pe care l-a castigat in urma intrarii in vigoare a Protocolului 14 in 2008. Pe langa comisar, au mai intervenit Human Rights Watch, Centru Euroregional pentru Politici Publice, Comitetul Helsinki Bulgar si Mental Disability Advocoacy Centre. Toate aceste documente sunt disponibile aici. 

Prin urmare, hotararea in cauza Campeanu este relevanta atat pentru Romania, dar si pentru regiunea Consiliului Europei in intregul ei. Una din mizele principale ale cazului este de ordin procedural - respectiv daca si in ce conditii poate o organizatie guvernamentala reprezenta o persoana in justitie fara mandat expres din partea acesteia. Pozitia traditionala a Curtii este ca doar rudele decedatului pot introduce o actiune in justitie vizand circumstantele decesului. In cauza noastra, avem de a face cu o persoana cu deficit de invatare care a fost institutionalizata toata viata, abandonat la nastere, si fara alt reprezentant legal, si deci prin urmare conditia restrictiva impusa de Curte nu poate fi indeplinita. O hotarare prin care Curtea ar recunoaste calitatea procesuala - in circumstante limitate - a ong-urilor de a reprezenta fara mandat expres anumite categorii de persoane in temeiul situatiei dificile in care se afla (persoane institutionalizate, dar si, spre exemplu, persoane detinute 'incomunicado', alte persoane fara rude decedate in situatii suspecte, persoane expulzate si cu care nu se poate pastra legatura etc etc), in baza interesului public, ar reprezenta un pas mare pentru protectia drepturilor omului in Europa. 

In mod tragic, Valentin Campeanu reuneste in persoana sa trasaturile unor grupuri greu incercate in perioada comunismului si in "tranzitia" spre democratie: copiii orfani, cei seropozitivi si persoanele cu dizabilitati din institutii. Dezbaterile prilejuite de procedurile in fata Marii Camere ofera societatii romanesti inca o oportunitate de a-si confrunta demonii, si implicit de a raspunde intrebarii fundamentale daca acum ne putem privi in oglinda cu constiinta impacata (raspund deja: nu). Din punct de vedere conventional, Marea Camera are de rezolvat chestiuni importante precum caracterul obligatiilor ce le revin statelor in ceea ce priveste protectia persoanelor cu deficit intelectual in institutii, accesul lor la justitie, raspunderea pentru falimentul generalizat al sistemului de ingrijire al persoanenelor cu dizabilitati, remediile aplicabile in asemenea situatii etc. O lista grea...sper ca instanta sa aprofundeze macar o parte din aceste chestiuni. 

In perioada care urmeaza, pana la sedinta publica in fata Marii Camere (a carei data urmeaza a fi stabilita) voi incerca sa scriu o serie de postari care nu se vor limita - inevitabil - la partea juridica a cazului - ci vor incerca sa il plaseze intr-un context istoric si cultural mai larg (de genul: o comparatie intre Valentin Campeanu si Irina Cornici, protagonista filmului Dupa dealuri inspirat, si el, din fapte reale?). Asta e planul, sper sa am timpul si inspiratia de a-l realiza.