Hämäläinen v Finland - Preview of the judgment by Constantin Cojocariu

(CROSS-POSTED FROM THE ECHR SEXUAL ORIENTATION BLOG)

In advance of the Grand Chamber judgment in Hämäläinen v Finland next Wednesday, Constantin Cojocariu has written a guest post on the case. Constantin is the applicant's lawyer, and represented her in the Grand Chamber hearing last October. Many thanks to Constantin for this insightful and interesting post. 

The Court has recently announced it will deliver its judgment in the Hamalainen v Finland case on 16 July. The facts of this case are relatively straightforward. Heli Hamalainen, the applicant, is a trans woman who has been married for many years and who has a 12-year old child with her wife. She came out as transgender during marriage, and applied for legal gender recognition. The authorities in Finland rejected her request, as she and her wife were not willing to forgo their marriage, a precondition to legal gender recognition under national law. The applicant exhausted domestic remedies and lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining about breaches of her rights under Article 8 (right to private and family life), Article 12 (right to marry) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). On 13 November 2012, the Chamber rejected the complaint on all counts, based on reasoning that was reminiscent of that employed in the same-sex marriage case Schalk and Kopf v Austria. In that case, the Court made it clear that the Convention did not require states to open marriage to same-sex couples, and that that option remained within their margin of appreciation, at least for the time being. The Hamalainen judgment was even out of step with previous judgments in forced divorce cases (namely Parry v the United Kingdom), where the Court at least acknowledged the predicament of spouses in a transgender marriage faced with the choice between marriage and legal gender recognition. This article discusses some of the choices I have made, as the applicant’s main counsel, during proceedings before the Court, the different factors that may influence the eventual decision, as well as, briefly, the possible outcomes before the Grand Chamber.

I got involved in the case after the Chamber delivered its judgment, and asked that it be referred to the Grand Chamber, based on reasons discussed in a guest post published previously on this blog. In my request and subsequently during proceedings before the Grand Chamber, I tried very hard to distinguish the case from the broader question of same-sex marriage. Some commentators, including Paul Johnson, criticised my choice, stating that it would have been preferable to argue the case for same sex marriage more broadly. Indeed, equal marriage legislation also benefits transgender spouses, as it removes the underlying objection to legal gender recognition of the trans spouse. However, in my view, attempting to distance ourselves as much as possible from the contentious issue of same-sex marriage was the only reasonable chance we had to succeed.

The Court is obviously not ready to move forward on the issue, at least not until a more solid consensus builds among Council of Europe member states towards opening marriage to same-sex couples. And there are sufficient grounds for making this distinction – forced divorce legislation severs an existing marriage that is valid and intact, whereas discriminatory marriage legislation does not allow same-sex marriage to form in the first place. We emphasized that there were countries that had made this distinction (such as Germany and Switzerland), demonstrating that allowing transgender marriages to subsist did not necessarily require equalising marriage rights. Experience shows that the Court will only find a breach of the Convention on the narrowest of grounds, and that it usually refrains from deciding incidental issues that it was not called to decide in the first place. My choice was strategic, and is not dissimilar for example to that made by the applicants in X and Others v Austria, on second-parent adoption in a same-sex couple, who stressed that they were not seeking to compare their situation to that of married different sex couples (at §108). On the other hand, if I tried to draw attention from the elephant in the room - same-sex marriage - I did so in the knowledge that a positive outcome would benefit indirectly homosexual couples as well, by substantially undermining the rationale for preserving marriage as an institution reserved for different sex couples.   

The particular setup in Finland makes this case a slightly more difficult proposal. Transgender marriages are not ended by divorce upon the legal gender recognition of one of the spouses (in that sense, the system may be more accurately described as triggering the “forced dissolution of marriage” rather than “forced divorce”). Instead, marriages are automatically and comparatively painlessly converted into registered partnerships, upon the consent of the cisgender spouse. In addition, registered partnerships in Finland are more or less identical to marriage in terms of the rights and benefits conferred on the spouses as well as in relation to their children. The legal regime in place in Finland is therefore relatively benign, at least compared to other countries where alternatives to marriage are not available and/or divorce proceedings are particularly arduous and lengthy.

It therefore follows that I had to fall back on the personal and religious significance of marriage in general, and to the spouses in this case in particular. Although the applicant had not made a claim under Article 9, I tried to introduce religious considerations through the back door of Article 8 - married life comes with the scope of “family rights” and marriage is recognised to also have a religious dimension. This is a very strong argument, particularly pertinent to the applicant and her spouse, which the Court cannot easily discount as it mines the rich vein of its jurisprudence emphasizing the privileged status of marriage, justifying preferential legal treatment. Particularly in our day and age, the state has no business whatsoever interfering with valid marriages under any pretext, including the gender identity of the parties. In that sense, forced marriage legislation, as well as the reasoning of the Chamber in this case, very well reveal (as argued by Andrew Sharpe in Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodiesof Law) the “intrinsic homophobia of the law.”

Three additional brief observations. Perhaps it would have been preferable to include the applicant’s spouse, as well as their child, as victims in their own right from the very beginning of the proceedings before the Court, as their family rights are more obviously interfered with. That said, the Court is obligated in principle to also consider the consequences of the forced divorce scheme on third parties, including family members, during its proportionality examination under Article 8. Second, two processes are ongoing in Finland in parallel with proceedings in this case, which may result eventually in the repealing of forced marriage legislation. A legislative initiative is currently before the Finnish Parliament to equalise marriage rights, which however appears to have run into some trouble; and a committee was formed to look into the possibility of revising legal gender recognition legislation, including by abandoning the divorce requirement. To the extent that either of these processes had been concluded successfully before the Court delivered its judgment, that would have constituted a substantial consideration in the process of adjudicating the case in Strasbourg as well, potentially undermining the government’s insistence that there had been religiously and morally inspired objections in Finland. Finally, I spent a fair amount of time and space trying to unpack the normative contents of Article 12 on the right to marry. Without going into details, it seems to me that forced divorce legislation empties Article 12 of any significance, to the extent that Article 12 is interpreted as allowing the state to interfere with valid marriages to the point of triggering their dissolution. It will be interesting to see how the Court decides this issue.

To conclude, there are three possible outcomes in this case. The first is a win, which may vary in scope, to include various combinations of the claims made. This would be an amazing outcome, with substantial consequences for standards in the area of legal gender recognition more generally as well as marriage rights. The second is a qualified loss, but based on a more principled and sympathetic approach to the applicant’s situation and transgender rights in general. In this scenario, the Court may reject the application based on the lack of any material differences between marriage and registered partnerships in Finland.  While this would open the way for challenges against forced divorce legislation in countries without alternatives to marriage, it may spill over by encouraging states to maintain similar but segregated legal regimes for same-sex and different sex couples respectively. The third, and the least likely, outcome is the worst, with the Grand Chamber endorsing the Chamber decision, thus in effect denying the specificity of the issues raised in transgender cases.

Constantin Cojocariu is an independent human rights expert and lawyer specialised in advising transgender and disabled applicants in proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights.

Grand Chamber to announce judgments in two of my cases/Marea Camera urmeaza sa se pronunte in doua din cauzele mele

[EN] The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights will announce the judgments in two of my cases on two consecutive days as follows:

Heli Hamalainen v. Finland - 16 July

The Center for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Campeanu v. Romania - 17 July

In both cases I have acted as the main counsel to the applicants. 

[RO] Marea Camera a Curtii Europene pentru Drepturile Omului se va pronunta in doua dintre cauzele mele in doua zile consecutive, dupa cum urmeaza:

Heli Hamalainen impotriva Finlandei - 16 iulie

Centrul pentru Resurse Juridice in numele lui Valentin Campeanu impotriva Romaniei - 17 iulie

Am actionat in calitate de reprezentant principal al reclamantilor in ambele cauze. 

McDonald v United Kingdom: the European Court decides that money trumps dignity and human rights

Elaine McDonald needed to go to the toilet several times during the night because of bladder problems, although she was not incontinent. A former ballerina, she suffered a stroke and several falls in her old age. Because of impaired mobility, she could not get to the toilet on her own. The local authority initially paid for a carer to help her during the night, but then revised its initial assessment, offering her incontinence pads and sheets instead. On 6 July 2011, the United Kingdom Supreme Court upheld the local authorities’ decision. Baroness Hale wrote a hard-hitting dissent, famously stating that:

“In the United Kingdom we do not oblige people who can control their bodily functions to behave as if they cannot do so, unless they themselves find this the more convenient course. We are, I still believe, a civilised society. I would have allowed this appeal.”

A week ago, on 20 May 2014, the European Court of Human Rights partially dismissed Elaine McDonald’s challenge against the Supreme Court judgment as manifestly ill-founded and partially accepted it, finding a violation of Article 8. Although the ruling was fairly straightforward, it elicited startlingly diverse reactions. Lawyers from British law firm Doughty Street Chambers, who supported the applicant in Strasbourg, hailed the judgment on Twitter as “landmark” and “historic.” The British Institute for Human Rights enthusiastically welcomed it as “a timely reminder that whilst tough economic decisions rest with the national authorities, those decisions must respect our basic human rights.” Surprisingly, the main offender in the story also claimed victory: a spokeswoman for Kensington and Chelsea Council said they were “greatly relieved” by the Court’s ruling on what was “an immensely important case.” As the judgment sank in with disability campaigners, the reactions became considerably more reserved. The ruling was described as “disappointing”; “outrageous”; “an attack on human rights”; we “are moving back to medieval times” – campaigners said. Everybody seemed to agree on one point – that this was a significant ruling. So why was it significant, and if this was a victory, whose was it?

I start my brief analysis with the second, and the most consequential, part of the ruling, which the Court declared manifestly ill founded. The Court essentially decided that the Government was entitled to reduce the package of care offered to the applicant, as part of its margin of appreciation. Since the Supreme Court adequately balanced all interests involved, the Court deferred to its judgment, and did not find it necessary to engage in a proportionality assessment of its own. In effect, the margin of appreciation available to the state became all-encompassing, as the decision-making process the national level was perceived as fair and respectful of the rights involved, and the decision in question concerned questions of policy which the state was best left to decide on its own.

This is a depressingly familiar outcome, in line with previous judgments in cases involving disabled applicants who complained about lack of assistance from the state in a variety of contexts, including in relation to the accessibility of built infrastructure. McDonald most closely resembles Sentges v the Netherlands, where the applicant, whose mobility was severely impaired, complained about the authorities’ refusal to cover the costs of a robotic arm, which would have considerably improved his autonomy and quality of life. The Court dismissed the case as manifestly ill-founded, employing arguments that echo those used in McDonald. By comparing the two judgments, it is apparent that the Court’s disability case law has not moved even one inch since 2003 when Sentges was decided, largely impervious to developments that occurred in the meantime, mainly the advent of the UN Disability Rights Convention.

The Court justified its hands-off approach by having recourse to the mantra that the decision to reduce care was one pertaining to general social and economic policies, involving an assessment of the priorities in the context of the allocation of limited resources, over which the State had full discretion. This line of jurisprudence suggests that the extent of costly support with social inclusion and independent living will always come within the states’ margin of appreciation, and accordingly cannot possibly raise any issues under the Convention. McDonald confirms once more, if it was necessary, the Court’s incongruous position that price tags always and invariably trump rights when it comes to people with disabilities, even where, as in this case, and as suggested by Baroness Hale, without care, people (who are not even incontinent) may be left lying in their faeces. By contrast, in other areas – such as prison conditions or environmental rights – financial implications did not prevent the Court from developing relatively robust jurisprudence.

Those who welcomed the McDonald judgment have done so for two reasons. The Court found a violation of Article 8 on the basis that for almost one year, the national authorities were in breach of their statutory duty to provide the applicant with night care. National courts, and the Government in proceedings before the Court, actually conceded this point. In any event, the extent of this failure was very limited, since during the period in question there was partial provision - for five, and then four, days a week. This enabled the Court to only award the applicant 1000 Euro in non-pecuniary damages, also justified by the fact that the applicant received additional assistance from her partner. Lawyers to the applicant hailed this as the first ever finding of violation of Article 8 in cases concerning the provision of services or support to a disabled person. Although technically accurate, this claim is particularly hollow, since this violation, predicated on lack of compliance with the national law and not involving any proportionality assessment, is not disability specific. As an aside, the Court’s practice in this respect is not even consistent, as there are many examples where a breach of domestic law is not a sufficiently strong ground on its own to justify a finding of a breach of the Convention  (see for example another disability judgment, in the case Botta v Italy).

Second, some welcomed the Court’s affirmation that the applicant’s dignity was engaged in the decisions to reduce her care. In the most arresting paragraph of the judgment, the Court likened Mrs. McDonald’s situation with that of the applicant in the end-of-life case Pretty v the United Kingdom, since in both cases the ability to live (or die) in a dignified manner, in line with “strongly held ideas of self and personal identity“, was at stake. The Court cited approvingly from Baroness Hale’s dissenting opinion “who appeared to accept that considerations of human dignity were engaged when someone who could control her bodily functions was obliged to behave as if she could not.”   

Dignity is a slippery concept, whose meaning and usefulness in human rights adjudication have been contested. Lucy Series pointed out that in this case national courts adopted unquestioningly the local authorities’ view that incontinence pads better protected Mrs. McDonald’s privacy and dignity than support from a carer overnight, regardless of her feelings on the matter. According to Series, this compounded the applicant’s suffering, “inflicted upon her the separate and additional indignity of denying her experience”, besides raising fundamental questions about the nature of “dignity.” On a different level of inquiry, in an article containing a stinging criticism of the Court’s approach to disability, Luke Clements remarked that although “a senior judge in possession of a hard ‘disability’ case is want to expound at length on ‘dignity’, they will very rarely actually finger a concrete situation and identify it as an “indignity”.  Judges “appear to comprehend dignity on an objective intellectual plane but are unable to express …subjectively the meaning of what it is to suffer indignity.” In what may seem as a very apposite premonition of what happened in McDonald, Clements also stated that “‘dignity’ becomes something defined by a process - and perforce ‘indignity’ in terms of a flawed process - and not as an issue of substance.”

However, far from being a premonition, this was a sound assessment of the Court’s approach to disability claims, of which McDonald is only the latest installment. The Court has consistently rejected claims for support for independent living in a variety of contexts, while simultaneously invoking grand values like dignity, and professing empathy to the plight of persons with disabilities (“The Court by no means wishes to underestimate the difficulties encountered by the applicant and it appreciates the very distressing situation she is facing,” McDonald at §38). The same applies in this case – acknowledging that the applicant’s dignity was engaged did not prevent the Court from completely deferring to national courts, refusing to subject the notional breach of dignity to independent scrutiny, and rejecting the case as manifestly ill-founded, i.e.: as not even arguable. Dignity therefore functions as a rhetorical device, employed by the Court as cover to escape any responsibility towards people with disabilities.  In that sense, the conclusion that the emphasis on dignity in this case will have a positive bearing on decisions in individual cases, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, appears rushed, as long as it lacked any traction before the Court itself.

Summing up, in its judgment in the case McDonald v United Kingdom, the Court confirmed that States are not bound to provide any particular level of assistance or care to persons with disabilities, which they can withdraw at will, regardless of any implications for the dignity of the person concerned. This outcome consolidates a much maligned and anachronistic strand of the Court’s jurisprudence, begging the question of the very relevance of the European Convention on Human Rights to persons with disabilities. The Court’s decision not to subject the local authority’s decision to any substantive scrutiny, and dismiss the case out of hand as not raising any arguable human rights issues is striking, particular considering how controversial domestic proceedings were, reflected in a split Supreme Court.  Considering that this was probably the first case concerning the impact on disabled people of massive welfare retrenchment across Europe, in the context of the economic crisis, the outcome is quite disheartening. While this judgment was certainly a victory for the local authority, it must have been devastating to the applicant herself, who faces the prospect of wearing incontinence pads for the rest of her life. Portraying the outcome in any other way distorts this basic truth, and relieves the Court from any pressure to improve its act when it comes to persons with disabilities.

The author is an experienced human rights lawyer, currently acting as main counsel in three cases pending before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, including the only two disability cases at this level - Campeanu v Romania and Gherghina v Romania. 

The first case before the ECHR that analyses the institution of personal assistance from a human rights perspective/ Prima cauza la CEDO care analizeaza institutia asistentului personal din perspectiva drepturilor omului

This is the statement issued by the European Network for Independent Living (ENIL) on one of the cases I have filed recently with the ECHR

Aceasta este o nota informativa publicata de Reteaua europeana pentru un trai independent cu privire la un caz pe care l-am initiat recent la CEDO - textul in limba romana este disponibil in josul paginii.

Dublin, 12 May 2014 – ENIL welcomes the first complaint concerning access of disabled people to personal assistance submitted to the European Court of Human Rights. The case of Radi v. Romania, submitted earlier this month, challenges the manner in which personal assistance is provided to disabled people. It argues that such treatment amounts to violation of Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour), Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In Romania, personal assistance is provided mainly by family members, without taking into account the individual needs of the disabled person, or their preferences. As such, personal assistance does not support the independent living of disabled people and forces their family members (predominantly women) to give up their jobs and become full-time carers. Although formally employees of the state, personal assistants are deprived of most rights guaranteed under Romania’s Labour Code and are paid a minimum wage, regardless of their qualification, previous work experience or the number of working hours. They also effectively do not have a right to rest, even though they may be caring for their family member 24/7.

Rather than support the enjoyment of the right to independent living, the complaint argues that personal assistance contributes to social isolation of disabled people. It is provided without an individual assessment and involvement of disabled people, resulting in the same amount of hours allocated to anyone classified as having a ‘serious handicap’. Disabled people are not involved in recruiting, training or managing their personal assistants. Moreover, the salaries allocated to personal assistants are too low to recruit anyone on the open labour market.

Personal assistance is one of the services included in Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by most EU Member States, including Romania. This case raises important questions about how personal assistance is provided and whether it genuinely supports the right to independent living. It presents the Court with an opportunity to develop its jurisprudence on the right of disabled people to live in the community – for which personal assistance is a necessary prerequisite.

For ENIL’s definition of Personal Assistance, please see: http://www.enil.eu/policy/ For further information about the case, please contact the applicant’s counsel before the European Court of Human Rights: Constantin Cojocariu, constantincojocariu@yahoo.com

Romanian version:

Primul caz privind asistenții personali la Curtea Europeană pentru Drepturile Omului

Dublin, 12.5. 2014 – ENIL salută ca binevenită prima plângere privind accesul persoanelor cu dizabilități laasistență personală, înaintată Curții Europene pentru Drepturile Omului. Cazul Radi contra României, inițiat recent, contestă maniera în care asistența personală este furnizată persoanelor cu dizabilități, încălcând Articolul 4 (prohibiția sclaviei și a muncii forțate), Articolul 8 (dreptul la viață privată și de familie) și Articolul 14 (prohibiția discriminării) ale Convenției Europene pentru Drepturile Omului

În România, asistența personală este furnizată în principal de către membrii familiei, fără a se lua în considerare nevoile individuale sau preferințele persoanei cu dizabilități. Ca atare, asistența personală nu susţine traiul independent al persoanelor cu dizabilități și obligă rudele lor (femei în principal) să renunțe la locurile lor de muncă, pentru a furniza îngrijiri in regim permanent. Deşi în mod formal asistenții personali sunt angajați ai Statului, ei nu beneficiază de majoritatea drepturilor garantate in Codul Muncii românesc și sunt plătiți cu salariul minim garantat, indiferent de calificare, experiența profesională anterioară sau numarul orelor efectiv lucrate. De asemenea, ei nu beneficiază de dreptul la odihnă, chiar dacă uneori ei furnizează îngrijiri non-stop.

Reclamanții susțin că în loc să susțină dreptul la un trai independent, asistența personală furnizată intr-o asemenea manieră contribuie la izolarea socială a persoanelor cu dizabilități. Fără o examinare individualizată și fără implicarea persoanei cu dizabilități, asistenții personali sunt plătiți pentru un număr de ore identic, pentru servicii prestate oricui este încadrat la gradul de “handicap grav”. Persoanele cu dizabilități nu sunt implicate in recrutarea, pregătirea sau management-ul asistenților lor personali. Mai mult decât atât, salariile plătite asistenților personali sunt prea mici pentru a motiva pe cineva recrutat pe piața liberă a muncii.

Asistența personală este unul din serviciile incluse in Articolul 19 al Covenției Națiunilor Unite privind Drepturile Persoanelor cu Dizabilități, care a fost ratiifcată de majoritatea statelor membre ale Uniunii Europene, incluzând România. Acest caz ridică probleme importante  privind maniera în care asistența personală este furnizată și gradul în care susține dreptul la un trai independent. Mai mult decât atât, el prezintă Curții o oportunitate de a-și dezvolta juriprudența cu privire la dreptul persoanelor cu dizabilități de a trai în comunitate – pentru care asistența personală este o condiție necesară.

Pentru informații suplimentare îl puteți contacta pe Constantin Cojocariu, reprezentantul reclamanților, la adresa de e-mail constantincojocariu@yahoo.com.

Lansare compilatie hotarari CEDO impotriva Romaniei pe tema dizabilitatii

Curtea Europeana pentru Drepturile Omului (CEDO) a pronuntat deja mai multe hotarari impotriva Romaniei in dosare initiate de persoane cu dizabilitati, ridicand o gama variata de probleme: lipsa unei anchete efective cu privire la plangeri de viol formulate de femei cu dizabilitati, conditii de trai in locuri de detentie (inclusiv cu privire la lipsa accesibilitatii), procedurile de internare involuntara, capacitate juridica etc. Aceste cazuri au fost cel mai adesea rezultatul efortului individual al victimelor, care nu beneficiat de regula de asistenta juridica. Multe din dosarele care sunt acum pe rol sunt insa sustinute de organizatii neguvernamentale si avocati profesionisti, ridicand chestiuni inedite de drept. Anticipez deci ca aceasta juriprudenta va deveni din ce in ce mai diversa, contribuind la o schimbare pozitiva a standardelor de protectie a persoanelor cu dizabilitati in Romania si nu numai.

Mai jos trec in revista aceste dosare, incluzand cauze care s-au soldat cu hotarari de incalcare a Conventiei, decizii de inadmisibilitate, decizii de radiere de pe rol (care au si ele semnificatia lor), precum si cateva din cauzele care sunt pendinte, insotite de planurile de actiune depuse de Guvern la Comitetul de Ministri in cardul procesului de implementare a obligatiilor care ii revin, si alte comentarii si articole publicate pe acest blog in trecut. Pun la dispozitie aceasta resursa, pe care intentionez sa o aduc la zi in timp real, tuturor celor interesati, in speranta ca o vor folosi in munca lor: persoane cu dizabilitati, organizatii neguvernamentale, autoritati ale statului, studenti si cadre didactice. Pentru orice fel de comentarii pe marginea acestei compilatii va rog sa ma contactati la adresa: constantincojocariu@yahoo.com.

Baza de date este disponibila sub forma unei pagini separate a acestui blog AICI. 

Solicitare de ajutor de la persoane cu dizabilitati care au avut contact cu invatamantul superior din Romania

Am trimis pe facebook o solicitarea de asistenta, prea laconica insa,  asa incat acum vin cu explicatii suplimentare. 

Il reprezint pe reclamant in dosarul Gherghina impotriva Romaniei, aflat pe rolul Curtii Europene pentru Drepturile Omului. Reclamantul este un tanar in scaun cu rotile, care in cursul catorva ani s-a inscris la trei universitati: Universitatea Constantin Brancoveanu din Pitesti, Universitatea de Stat din Pitesti si Universitatea Ecologica din Bucuresti. De fiecare data, reclamantul a trebuit sa renunte la studii din cauza faptului ca infrastructura acestor institutii era inaccesibila, din lipsa masurilor de adaptare rezonabila, si in general, din cauza lipsei disponibilitatii de a ajuta din martea managementului acestor institutii. Dosarul a fost trimis la Marea Camera, avand potentialul de a deveni un precedent care sa imbunatateasca standardele legale de protectie a persoanelor cu dizabilitati in Romania in special si in Europa in general. Mai multe informatii privind acest caz sunt disponibile (in franceza) pe website-ul Curtii Europene de Drepturile Omului la ACEASTA ADRESA, in josul paginii.

In aceasta perioada pregatesc argumentele clientului meu. Intre altele, imi propun sa demonstrez ca problema lipsei accesibilitatii institutiilor de invatamant superior de stat sau private din Romania este generalizata. Intrucat aceasta problema a fost insuficient cercetata, caut persoane cu dizabilitati care au incercat sa studieze dar nu au reusit, care au studiat recent sau care studiaza la universitati in Romania. In masura in care sunteti de acord sa ma ajutati, am nevoie de o declaratie scrisa de doua-trei pagini din partea voastra, in care sa expuneti pe scurt problemele (de acces, de atitudine etc.) pe care le-ati intampinat la universitate, masura in care managementul acestor institutii a fost dispus sa va asiste in rezolvarea acestora, solutiile pe care le-ati incercat pentru a va continua studiile, si care a fost deznodamantul acestor situatii. Aceste documente vor fi varsate la dosarul CEDO si nu vor fi facute publice (decat in masura in care doriti asta). Tot ce aveti de pierdut este eventual timpul consumat cu redactarea acestui document, potential compensat de sentimentul ca puneti umarul la rezolvarea acestor probleme pentru viitor. 

Va rog sa luati legatura cu mine oricand, inclusiv in cazul in care ati avea nelamuriri, la adresa de email constantincojocariu@yahoo.com sau pe facebook. Pentru a putea sa le folosesc, as avea nevoie de aceste informatii cat mai repede, insa cel mai tarziu pana pe 30 iunie 2014. 

Va multumesc,

Constantin Cojocariu