Grand Chamber to announce judgments in two of my cases/Marea Camera urmeaza sa se pronunte in doua din cauzele mele

[EN] The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights will announce the judgments in two of my cases on two consecutive days as follows:

Heli Hamalainen v. Finland - 16 July

The Center for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Campeanu v. Romania - 17 July

In both cases I have acted as the main counsel to the applicants. 

[RO] Marea Camera a Curtii Europene pentru Drepturile Omului se va pronunta in doua dintre cauzele mele in doua zile consecutive, dupa cum urmeaza:

Heli Hamalainen impotriva Finlandei - 16 iulie

Centrul pentru Resurse Juridice in numele lui Valentin Campeanu impotriva Romaniei - 17 iulie

Am actionat in calitate de reprezentant principal al reclamantilor in ambele cauze. 

McDonald v United Kingdom: the European Court decides that money trumps dignity and human rights

Elaine McDonald needed to go to the toilet several times during the night because of bladder problems, although she was not incontinent. A former ballerina, she suffered a stroke and several falls in her old age. Because of impaired mobility, she could not get to the toilet on her own. The local authority initially paid for a carer to help her during the night, but then revised its initial assessment, offering her incontinence pads and sheets instead. On 6 July 2011, the United Kingdom Supreme Court upheld the local authorities’ decision. Baroness Hale wrote a hard-hitting dissent, famously stating that:

“In the United Kingdom we do not oblige people who can control their bodily functions to behave as if they cannot do so, unless they themselves find this the more convenient course. We are, I still believe, a civilised society. I would have allowed this appeal.”

A week ago, on 20 May 2014, the European Court of Human Rights partially dismissed Elaine McDonald’s challenge against the Supreme Court judgment as manifestly ill-founded and partially accepted it, finding a violation of Article 8. Although the ruling was fairly straightforward, it elicited startlingly diverse reactions. Lawyers from British law firm Doughty Street Chambers, who supported the applicant in Strasbourg, hailed the judgment on Twitter as “landmark” and “historic.” The British Institute for Human Rights enthusiastically welcomed it as “a timely reminder that whilst tough economic decisions rest with the national authorities, those decisions must respect our basic human rights.” Surprisingly, the main offender in the story also claimed victory: a spokeswoman for Kensington and Chelsea Council said they were “greatly relieved” by the Court’s ruling on what was “an immensely important case.” As the judgment sank in with disability campaigners, the reactions became considerably more reserved. The ruling was described as “disappointing”; “outrageous”; “an attack on human rights”; we “are moving back to medieval times” – campaigners said. Everybody seemed to agree on one point – that this was a significant ruling. So why was it significant, and if this was a victory, whose was it?

I start my brief analysis with the second, and the most consequential, part of the ruling, which the Court declared manifestly ill founded. The Court essentially decided that the Government was entitled to reduce the package of care offered to the applicant, as part of its margin of appreciation. Since the Supreme Court adequately balanced all interests involved, the Court deferred to its judgment, and did not find it necessary to engage in a proportionality assessment of its own. In effect, the margin of appreciation available to the state became all-encompassing, as the decision-making process the national level was perceived as fair and respectful of the rights involved, and the decision in question concerned questions of policy which the state was best left to decide on its own.

This is a depressingly familiar outcome, in line with previous judgments in cases involving disabled applicants who complained about lack of assistance from the state in a variety of contexts, including in relation to the accessibility of built infrastructure. McDonald most closely resembles Sentges v the Netherlands, where the applicant, whose mobility was severely impaired, complained about the authorities’ refusal to cover the costs of a robotic arm, which would have considerably improved his autonomy and quality of life. The Court dismissed the case as manifestly ill-founded, employing arguments that echo those used in McDonald. By comparing the two judgments, it is apparent that the Court’s disability case law has not moved even one inch since 2003 when Sentges was decided, largely impervious to developments that occurred in the meantime, mainly the advent of the UN Disability Rights Convention.

The Court justified its hands-off approach by having recourse to the mantra that the decision to reduce care was one pertaining to general social and economic policies, involving an assessment of the priorities in the context of the allocation of limited resources, over which the State had full discretion. This line of jurisprudence suggests that the extent of costly support with social inclusion and independent living will always come within the states’ margin of appreciation, and accordingly cannot possibly raise any issues under the Convention. McDonald confirms once more, if it was necessary, the Court’s incongruous position that price tags always and invariably trump rights when it comes to people with disabilities, even where, as in this case, and as suggested by Baroness Hale, without care, people (who are not even incontinent) may be left lying in their faeces. By contrast, in other areas – such as prison conditions or environmental rights – financial implications did not prevent the Court from developing relatively robust jurisprudence.

Those who welcomed the McDonald judgment have done so for two reasons. The Court found a violation of Article 8 on the basis that for almost one year, the national authorities were in breach of their statutory duty to provide the applicant with night care. National courts, and the Government in proceedings before the Court, actually conceded this point. In any event, the extent of this failure was very limited, since during the period in question there was partial provision - for five, and then four, days a week. This enabled the Court to only award the applicant 1000 Euro in non-pecuniary damages, also justified by the fact that the applicant received additional assistance from her partner. Lawyers to the applicant hailed this as the first ever finding of violation of Article 8 in cases concerning the provision of services or support to a disabled person. Although technically accurate, this claim is particularly hollow, since this violation, predicated on lack of compliance with the national law and not involving any proportionality assessment, is not disability specific. As an aside, the Court’s practice in this respect is not even consistent, as there are many examples where a breach of domestic law is not a sufficiently strong ground on its own to justify a finding of a breach of the Convention  (see for example another disability judgment, in the case Botta v Italy).

Second, some welcomed the Court’s affirmation that the applicant’s dignity was engaged in the decisions to reduce her care. In the most arresting paragraph of the judgment, the Court likened Mrs. McDonald’s situation with that of the applicant in the end-of-life case Pretty v the United Kingdom, since in both cases the ability to live (or die) in a dignified manner, in line with “strongly held ideas of self and personal identity“, was at stake. The Court cited approvingly from Baroness Hale’s dissenting opinion “who appeared to accept that considerations of human dignity were engaged when someone who could control her bodily functions was obliged to behave as if she could not.”   

Dignity is a slippery concept, whose meaning and usefulness in human rights adjudication have been contested. Lucy Series pointed out that in this case national courts adopted unquestioningly the local authorities’ view that incontinence pads better protected Mrs. McDonald’s privacy and dignity than support from a carer overnight, regardless of her feelings on the matter. According to Series, this compounded the applicant’s suffering, “inflicted upon her the separate and additional indignity of denying her experience”, besides raising fundamental questions about the nature of “dignity.” On a different level of inquiry, in an article containing a stinging criticism of the Court’s approach to disability, Luke Clements remarked that although “a senior judge in possession of a hard ‘disability’ case is want to expound at length on ‘dignity’, they will very rarely actually finger a concrete situation and identify it as an “indignity”.  Judges “appear to comprehend dignity on an objective intellectual plane but are unable to express …subjectively the meaning of what it is to suffer indignity.” In what may seem as a very apposite premonition of what happened in McDonald, Clements also stated that “‘dignity’ becomes something defined by a process - and perforce ‘indignity’ in terms of a flawed process - and not as an issue of substance.”

However, far from being a premonition, this was a sound assessment of the Court’s approach to disability claims, of which McDonald is only the latest installment. The Court has consistently rejected claims for support for independent living in a variety of contexts, while simultaneously invoking grand values like dignity, and professing empathy to the plight of persons with disabilities (“The Court by no means wishes to underestimate the difficulties encountered by the applicant and it appreciates the very distressing situation she is facing,” McDonald at §38). The same applies in this case – acknowledging that the applicant’s dignity was engaged did not prevent the Court from completely deferring to national courts, refusing to subject the notional breach of dignity to independent scrutiny, and rejecting the case as manifestly ill-founded, i.e.: as not even arguable. Dignity therefore functions as a rhetorical device, employed by the Court as cover to escape any responsibility towards people with disabilities.  In that sense, the conclusion that the emphasis on dignity in this case will have a positive bearing on decisions in individual cases, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, appears rushed, as long as it lacked any traction before the Court itself.

Summing up, in its judgment in the case McDonald v United Kingdom, the Court confirmed that States are not bound to provide any particular level of assistance or care to persons with disabilities, which they can withdraw at will, regardless of any implications for the dignity of the person concerned. This outcome consolidates a much maligned and anachronistic strand of the Court’s jurisprudence, begging the question of the very relevance of the European Convention on Human Rights to persons with disabilities. The Court’s decision not to subject the local authority’s decision to any substantive scrutiny, and dismiss the case out of hand as not raising any arguable human rights issues is striking, particular considering how controversial domestic proceedings were, reflected in a split Supreme Court.  Considering that this was probably the first case concerning the impact on disabled people of massive welfare retrenchment across Europe, in the context of the economic crisis, the outcome is quite disheartening. While this judgment was certainly a victory for the local authority, it must have been devastating to the applicant herself, who faces the prospect of wearing incontinence pads for the rest of her life. Portraying the outcome in any other way distorts this basic truth, and relieves the Court from any pressure to improve its act when it comes to persons with disabilities.

The author is an experienced human rights lawyer, currently acting as main counsel in three cases pending before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, including the only two disability cases at this level - Campeanu v Romania and Gherghina v Romania. 

The first case before the ECHR that analyses the institution of personal assistance from a human rights perspective/ Prima cauza la CEDO care analizeaza institutia asistentului personal din perspectiva drepturilor omului

This is the statement issued by the European Network for Independent Living (ENIL) on one of the cases I have filed recently with the ECHR

Aceasta este o nota informativa publicata de Reteaua europeana pentru un trai independent cu privire la un caz pe care l-am initiat recent la CEDO - textul in limba romana este disponibil in josul paginii.

Dublin, 12 May 2014 – ENIL welcomes the first complaint concerning access of disabled people to personal assistance submitted to the European Court of Human Rights. The case of Radi v. Romania, submitted earlier this month, challenges the manner in which personal assistance is provided to disabled people. It argues that such treatment amounts to violation of Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour), Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In Romania, personal assistance is provided mainly by family members, without taking into account the individual needs of the disabled person, or their preferences. As such, personal assistance does not support the independent living of disabled people and forces their family members (predominantly women) to give up their jobs and become full-time carers. Although formally employees of the state, personal assistants are deprived of most rights guaranteed under Romania’s Labour Code and are paid a minimum wage, regardless of their qualification, previous work experience or the number of working hours. They also effectively do not have a right to rest, even though they may be caring for their family member 24/7.

Rather than support the enjoyment of the right to independent living, the complaint argues that personal assistance contributes to social isolation of disabled people. It is provided without an individual assessment and involvement of disabled people, resulting in the same amount of hours allocated to anyone classified as having a ‘serious handicap’. Disabled people are not involved in recruiting, training or managing their personal assistants. Moreover, the salaries allocated to personal assistants are too low to recruit anyone on the open labour market.

Personal assistance is one of the services included in Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by most EU Member States, including Romania. This case raises important questions about how personal assistance is provided and whether it genuinely supports the right to independent living. It presents the Court with an opportunity to develop its jurisprudence on the right of disabled people to live in the community – for which personal assistance is a necessary prerequisite.

For ENIL’s definition of Personal Assistance, please see: http://www.enil.eu/policy/ For further information about the case, please contact the applicant’s counsel before the European Court of Human Rights: Constantin Cojocariu, constantincojocariu@yahoo.com

Romanian version:

Primul caz privind asistenții personali la Curtea Europeană pentru Drepturile Omului

Dublin, 12.5. 2014 – ENIL salută ca binevenită prima plângere privind accesul persoanelor cu dizabilități laasistență personală, înaintată Curții Europene pentru Drepturile Omului. Cazul Radi contra României, inițiat recent, contestă maniera în care asistența personală este furnizată persoanelor cu dizabilități, încălcând Articolul 4 (prohibiția sclaviei și a muncii forțate), Articolul 8 (dreptul la viață privată și de familie) și Articolul 14 (prohibiția discriminării) ale Convenției Europene pentru Drepturile Omului

În România, asistența personală este furnizată în principal de către membrii familiei, fără a se lua în considerare nevoile individuale sau preferințele persoanei cu dizabilități. Ca atare, asistența personală nu susţine traiul independent al persoanelor cu dizabilități și obligă rudele lor (femei în principal) să renunțe la locurile lor de muncă, pentru a furniza îngrijiri in regim permanent. Deşi în mod formal asistenții personali sunt angajați ai Statului, ei nu beneficiază de majoritatea drepturilor garantate in Codul Muncii românesc și sunt plătiți cu salariul minim garantat, indiferent de calificare, experiența profesională anterioară sau numarul orelor efectiv lucrate. De asemenea, ei nu beneficiază de dreptul la odihnă, chiar dacă uneori ei furnizează îngrijiri non-stop.

Reclamanții susțin că în loc să susțină dreptul la un trai independent, asistența personală furnizată intr-o asemenea manieră contribuie la izolarea socială a persoanelor cu dizabilități. Fără o examinare individualizată și fără implicarea persoanei cu dizabilități, asistenții personali sunt plătiți pentru un număr de ore identic, pentru servicii prestate oricui este încadrat la gradul de “handicap grav”. Persoanele cu dizabilități nu sunt implicate in recrutarea, pregătirea sau management-ul asistenților lor personali. Mai mult decât atât, salariile plătite asistenților personali sunt prea mici pentru a motiva pe cineva recrutat pe piața liberă a muncii.

Asistența personală este unul din serviciile incluse in Articolul 19 al Covenției Națiunilor Unite privind Drepturile Persoanelor cu Dizabilități, care a fost ratiifcată de majoritatea statelor membre ale Uniunii Europene, incluzând România. Acest caz ridică probleme importante  privind maniera în care asistența personală este furnizată și gradul în care susține dreptul la un trai independent. Mai mult decât atât, el prezintă Curții o oportunitate de a-și dezvolta juriprudența cu privire la dreptul persoanelor cu dizabilități de a trai în comunitate – pentru care asistența personală este o condiție necesară.

Pentru informații suplimentare îl puteți contacta pe Constantin Cojocariu, reprezentantul reclamanților, la adresa de e-mail constantincojocariu@yahoo.com.

Lansare compilatie hotarari CEDO impotriva Romaniei pe tema dizabilitatii

Curtea Europeana pentru Drepturile Omului (CEDO) a pronuntat deja mai multe hotarari impotriva Romaniei in dosare initiate de persoane cu dizabilitati, ridicand o gama variata de probleme: lipsa unei anchete efective cu privire la plangeri de viol formulate de femei cu dizabilitati, conditii de trai in locuri de detentie (inclusiv cu privire la lipsa accesibilitatii), procedurile de internare involuntara, capacitate juridica etc. Aceste cazuri au fost cel mai adesea rezultatul efortului individual al victimelor, care nu beneficiat de regula de asistenta juridica. Multe din dosarele care sunt acum pe rol sunt insa sustinute de organizatii neguvernamentale si avocati profesionisti, ridicand chestiuni inedite de drept. Anticipez deci ca aceasta juriprudenta va deveni din ce in ce mai diversa, contribuind la o schimbare pozitiva a standardelor de protectie a persoanelor cu dizabilitati in Romania si nu numai.

Mai jos trec in revista aceste dosare, incluzand cauze care s-au soldat cu hotarari de incalcare a Conventiei, decizii de inadmisibilitate, decizii de radiere de pe rol (care au si ele semnificatia lor), precum si cateva din cauzele care sunt pendinte, insotite de planurile de actiune depuse de Guvern la Comitetul de Ministri in cardul procesului de implementare a obligatiilor care ii revin, si alte comentarii si articole publicate pe acest blog in trecut. Pun la dispozitie aceasta resursa, pe care intentionez sa o aduc la zi in timp real, tuturor celor interesati, in speranta ca o vor folosi in munca lor: persoane cu dizabilitati, organizatii neguvernamentale, autoritati ale statului, studenti si cadre didactice. Pentru orice fel de comentarii pe marginea acestei compilatii va rog sa ma contactati la adresa: constantincojocariu@yahoo.com.

Baza de date este disponibila sub forma unei pagini separate a acestui blog AICI. 

Solicitare de ajutor de la persoane cu dizabilitati care au avut contact cu invatamantul superior din Romania

Am trimis pe facebook o solicitarea de asistenta, prea laconica insa,  asa incat acum vin cu explicatii suplimentare. 

Il reprezint pe reclamant in dosarul Gherghina impotriva Romaniei, aflat pe rolul Curtii Europene pentru Drepturile Omului. Reclamantul este un tanar in scaun cu rotile, care in cursul catorva ani s-a inscris la trei universitati: Universitatea Constantin Brancoveanu din Pitesti, Universitatea de Stat din Pitesti si Universitatea Ecologica din Bucuresti. De fiecare data, reclamantul a trebuit sa renunte la studii din cauza faptului ca infrastructura acestor institutii era inaccesibila, din lipsa masurilor de adaptare rezonabila, si in general, din cauza lipsei disponibilitatii de a ajuta din martea managementului acestor institutii. Dosarul a fost trimis la Marea Camera, avand potentialul de a deveni un precedent care sa imbunatateasca standardele legale de protectie a persoanelor cu dizabilitati in Romania in special si in Europa in general. Mai multe informatii privind acest caz sunt disponibile (in franceza) pe website-ul Curtii Europene de Drepturile Omului la ACEASTA ADRESA, in josul paginii.

In aceasta perioada pregatesc argumentele clientului meu. Intre altele, imi propun sa demonstrez ca problema lipsei accesibilitatii institutiilor de invatamant superior de stat sau private din Romania este generalizata. Intrucat aceasta problema a fost insuficient cercetata, caut persoane cu dizabilitati care au incercat sa studieze dar nu au reusit, care au studiat recent sau care studiaza la universitati in Romania. In masura in care sunteti de acord sa ma ajutati, am nevoie de o declaratie scrisa de doua-trei pagini din partea voastra, in care sa expuneti pe scurt problemele (de acces, de atitudine etc.) pe care le-ati intampinat la universitate, masura in care managementul acestor institutii a fost dispus sa va asiste in rezolvarea acestora, solutiile pe care le-ati incercat pentru a va continua studiile, si care a fost deznodamantul acestor situatii. Aceste documente vor fi varsate la dosarul CEDO si nu vor fi facute publice (decat in masura in care doriti asta). Tot ce aveti de pierdut este eventual timpul consumat cu redactarea acestui document, potential compensat de sentimentul ca puneti umarul la rezolvarea acestor probleme pentru viitor. 

Va rog sa luati legatura cu mine oricand, inclusiv in cazul in care ati avea nelamuriri, la adresa de email constantincojocariu@yahoo.com sau pe facebook. Pentru a putea sa le folosesc, as avea nevoie de aceste informatii cat mai repede, insa cel mai tarziu pana pe 30 iunie 2014. 

Va multumesc,

Constantin Cojocariu

“Persoanele cu handicap se bucură de protecţie specială”*: Discursul instigator la ura la adresa persoanelor cu dizabilitati

Alegerile pentru Parlamentul European au readus in atentie tematica proliferarii discursului jignitor la adresa unor minoritati. In acest context, vreau sa examinez pe scurt o specie a acestui discurs mai putin studiata si asumata la noi, dar nu mai putin nociva, si anume cea care vizeaza copiii si adultii cu dizabilitati, si pe insotitorii lor. Acest tip de discurs este utilizat in mod curent, vizeaza persoanele cu dizabilitati direct sau indirect, este mai mult sau mai putin grosier, incluzand insulta nedisimulata, ofensa institutionalizata si scaparea gregara. Nu este apanajul nici unei categorii sociale, ci dimpotriva este cultivat in mod democratic atat de politicieni, cat si de oameni “de rand”. O nota privind terminologia – am in vedere si sintagma de “discurs instigator de ura” (“hate speech”), de inspiratie anglofona, poate mai familiar in acest context, atat timp cat il folosim in sensul lui cel mai larg posibil, si deci nu neaparat strict in sens juridic.

Tipologia discursului instigator de ura la adresa persoanelor cu dizabilitati e variata si complexa. In mod evident am in vedere in primul rand caracterul uzual al invectivelor de genul “handicapat”, “retard” si altele, probabil mai corozive decat “tigan”, si mai vitriolice decat “poponar”. Daca acestea din urma au fost expulzate cel putin formal din vocabularul “politically correct”, depreciativele desemnand dizabilitatea sunt consacrate atat la nivel constitutional (“handicap”), impamantenind simbolic politica oficiala de segregare si brutalizare a persoanelor cu dizabilitati, cat si uzitate in mod frecvent, bunaoara de catre comentatori si politicieni pentru a-si ataca adversarii (“retard”). Putem invoca in egala masura portretizarea persoanelor cu dizabilitati ca tapi ispasitori in contextul crizei economice, spoliatori ai societatii, abuzand fraudulos de compasiunea si solidaritatea publica –  Sebastian Lazaroiu in calitatea lui de fost ministru al muncii ofera un exemplu ilustru. Sau locul comun conform caruia persoanele cu dizabilitati sunt inerent si inevitabil periculoase, justificand masuri de control nediferentiate si extraordinare - spre exemplu un articol pe care l-am citit zilele trecute care punea automat problema cresterii accidentelor rutiere in romania in carca "handicapatilor" care obtin permisele de conducere fraudulos, fara a oferi vreo dovada in acest sens.

Mult mai pervers insa, autoritatile publice in special (si nu numai) practica un discurs cu semnificatie dubla, aparent invocand obligatia paternalista a statului de a proteja persoanele cu dizabilitati, dar in practica intensificand controlul si suprimarea sistematica a acestora. Am in vedere spre exemplu masuri desemnate violent si/sau arhaic precum “interdictia” sau “institutionalizarea”, care in mod oficial sunt descrise ca “masuri de protectie” ale persoanei in cauza. In aceasta logica, notiuni precum “acces” au deseori in practica semnificatia inversa de “restrictie”, “compasiune” are semnificatia de “dispret” samd.

Mai jos cateva mostre fascinante care demonstreaza cum prejudecata impotriva dizabilitatii este moneda curenta, practicata universal cu dezinvoltura si naturalete. Primele trei sunt extrase din dosarul cauzei Stoian v Romania pe care am introdus-o recent la cedo, privind dreptul la educatie al unui copil cu dizabilitati, ultimul dintr-un document emis de politie intr-un dosar al colegilor de la CRJ:

Unitatea noastra prin insasi natura ei, nu are nici un fel de conditii pentru terapia persoanelor cu handicap, noi fiind specializati pentru activitati cultural educative de masa in vederea depistarii talentelor si indrumarea lor catre activitati de performanta. (directoarea unui club al copiilor in Bucuresti)

Domnul director considera din parte cadrelor didactice a directiunii, a colectivului de parinti a existat multa intelegere de-a lungul celor cinci ani, si cu toate acestea a fost data in judecata. …Din partea profesorilor, parintilor, copiilor a existat bunavointa, dar trebuie aparate si drepturile celorlalti copii. De aceea domnul director si profesorii ii vor interzice accesul [insotitorului copilului cu dizabilitati] prezenta la ore. Parintii sustin decizia conducerii. (proces verbal sedinta cu parintii, scoala de masa)

“Referitor la petitia adresata acestei sectii [de politie]…prin care ati solicitat sa va fie precizate conditiile in care fiul dvoastra [persoana cu dizabilitati locomotorii] au acces in pe drumurile publice precum si in incinta unitatilor de invatamant de masa, va comunicam urmatoarele: [Cf Art. 15 din L. 448], “persoanele cu handicap au acces liber si egal la orice forma de educatie, indiferent de varsta, in conformitate cu tipul, gradul de handicap si nevoile educationale ale acestora”, astfel ca nu exista nici un fel de restrictie privind integrarea individuala a fiului dumneavoastra in unitati de invatamant de masa. De asemenea, in ceea ce priveste accesul copilui SS pe drumurile publice, precum si al insotitorului acestuia, nu exista nici un fel de restrictie, intrucat, [cf. art 25 din Constitutie], “dreptul la libera circulatie, in tara si in strainatate, este garantat”. 

In acest context al raporturilor educationale situatia de fata trebuie analizata pornind de la premiza ca sarcina de a educa un minor  (abandonat de familie si crescut intr-un mediu ostil) nu este o sarcina usoara si nici o sarcina ce poate fi indeplinita intotdeauna si in toate cazurile numai cu mijloace de maxima blandete. Sunt situatii in care trebuie sa se procedeze, dimpotriva cu fermitate si chiar cu severitate in scopul de a-l corija pe minor si de a-l determina la o conduita corespunzatoare.

Pe de o parte, unii ignora sau se revolta impotriva oricarei tentative de a sanctiona violenta de limbaj in public, condamnand-o ca o manifestare neavenita a mult blamatei corectitudini politice, sau negand ca ar avea implicatii semnificative. Chiar unii colegi din societatea civila minimalizeaza sau neaga existenta sau prevalenta in Romania a discursului instigator la ura care vizeaza persoanele cu dizabilitati, bunaoara in contextul mai sus-amintitei campanii     desfasurate in contexul alegerilor europarlamentare, care priveste aproape exclusiv romii si minoritatile sexuale - vezi aici si aici ("Studiul “Discursul instigator la ura in Romania” identifica principalele tinte ale DIU in Romania: minoritatea roma, cea evreiasca, maghiara si LGBT").  Limbajul jignitor la adresa persoanelor cu dizabilitati este, dupa cum am aratat, institutionalizat si prevalent. El reflecta fobii si prejudecati bine inradacinate si corespunde unor politici publice care izoleaza si victimizeaza. Ignorarea acestei problematici contribuie la normalizarea ei. Nu e de mirare ca orasele noastre sunt inaccesibile, ca copiii nostri (cu dizabilitati) nu merg la scoala, si ca atunci cand merg la scoala sunt abuzati sau neglijati, ca fratii si parintii nostri (cu dizabilitati) sunt brutalizati si isi traiesc toata viata inchisi in institutii in conditii mizere.

*Extras din Articolul 50 din Constitutie.